Files
2026-09-06 12:53:21 -06:00

275 lines
7.3 KiB
ArmAsm

/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
#include <linux/linkage.h>
#include <asm/asm.h>
#include <asm/bitsperlong.h>
#include <asm/nospec-branch.h>
#include <asm/percpu.h>
#include <asm/segment.h>
#include "kvm-asm-offsets.h"
#include "vmenter.h"
.section .noinstr.text, "ax"
/**
* __vmx_vcpu_run - Run a vCPU via a transition to VMX guest mode
* @vmx: struct vcpu_vmx *
* @flags: KVM_ENTER_VMRESUME: use VMRESUME instead of VMLAUNCH
* KVM_ENTER_SAVE_SPEC_CTRL: save guest SPEC_CTRL into vmx->spec_ctrl
* KVM_ENTER_CLEAR_CPU_BUFFERS_FOR_MMIO: vCPU can access host MMIO
*
* Returns:
* 0 on VM-Exit, 1 on VM-Fail
*/
SYM_FUNC_START(__vmx_vcpu_run)
push %_ASM_BP
mov %_ASM_SP, %_ASM_BP
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
push %r15
push %r14
push %r13
push %r12
#else
push %edi
push %esi
#endif
push %_ASM_BX
/* Save @vmx for SPEC_CTRL handling */
push %_ASM_ARG1
/* Save @flags (used for VMLAUNCH vs. VMRESUME and mitigations). */
push %_ASM_ARG2
lea (%_ASM_SP), %_ASM_ARG2
call vmx_update_host_rsp
/* Reload @vmx, _ASM_ARG1 may be modified by vmx_update_host_rsp(). */
mov WORD_SIZE(%_ASM_SP), %_ASM_DI
/*
* Unlike AMD there's no V_SPEC_CTRL here, so do not leave the body
* out of line. Clobbers RAX, RCX, RDX, RSI.
*/
ALTERNATIVE "jmp .Lspec_ctrl_guest_done", "", X86_FEATURE_MSR_SPEC_CTRL
RESTORE_GUEST_SPEC_CTRL_BODY VMX_spec_ctrl(%_ASM_DI), .Lspec_ctrl_guest_done
.Lspec_ctrl_guest_done:
/*
* Since vmentry is serializing on affected CPUs, there's no need for
* an LFENCE to stop speculation from skipping the wrmsr.
*/
/*
* Load guest registers. Don't clobber flags. Intentionally omit
* %_ASM_SP as it's context switched by hardware
*/
LOAD_REGS %_ASM_DI, VMX_vcpu_arch_regs, \
%_ASM_AX, %_ASM_CX, %_ASM_DX, %_ASM_BX, %_ASM_BP, %_ASM_SI
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
LOAD_REGS %_ASM_DI, VMX_vcpu_arch_regs, \
%r8, %r9, %r10, %r11, %r12, %r13, %r14, %r15
#endif
/* Load guest RDI. This kills the @vmx pointer! */
LOAD_REGS %_ASM_DI, VMX_vcpu_arch_regs, %_ASM_DI
/*
* Note, ALTERNATIVE_2 works in reverse order. If CLEAR_CPU_BUF_VM is
* enabled, do VERW unconditionally. If CPU_BUF_VM_MMIO is enabled,
* check @flags to see if the vCPU has access to host MMIO, and if so,
* do VERW. Else, do nothing (no mitigations needed/enabled).
*/
ALTERNATIVE_2 "", \
__stringify(testl $KVM_ENTER_CLEAR_CPU_BUFFERS_FOR_MMIO, (%_ASM_SP); \
jz .Lskip_mmio_verw; \
VERW; \
.Lskip_mmio_verw:), \
X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_CPU_BUF_VM_MMIO, \
__stringify(VERW), X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_CPU_BUF_VM
/* Check @flags to see if VMLAUNCH or VMRESUME is needed. */
testl $KVM_ENTER_VMRESUME, (%_ASM_SP)
jz .Lvmlaunch
/*
* After a successful VMRESUME/VMLAUNCH, control flow "magically"
* resumes below at 'vmx_vmexit' due to the VMCS HOST_RIP setting.
* So this isn't a typical function and objtool needs to be told to
* save the unwind state here and restore it below.
*/
UNWIND_HINT_SAVE
/*
* If VMRESUME/VMLAUNCH and corresponding vmexit succeed, execution resumes at
* the 'vmx_vmexit' label below.
*/
.Lvmresume:
vmresume
jmp .Lvmfail
.Lvmlaunch:
vmlaunch
jmp .Lvmfail
_ASM_EXTABLE(.Lvmresume, .Lfixup)
_ASM_EXTABLE(.Lvmlaunch, .Lfixup)
SYM_INNER_LABEL_ALIGN(vmx_vmexit, SYM_L_GLOBAL)
/* Restore unwind state from before the VMRESUME/VMLAUNCH. */
UNWIND_HINT_RESTORE
ENDBR
/* Temporarily save guest's RDI. */
push %_ASM_DI
/* Reload @vmx to RDI. */
mov 2*WORD_SIZE(%_ASM_SP), %_ASM_DI
/*
* Save all guest registers, including RDI from the stack. Intentionally
* omit %_ASM_SP as it's context switched by hardware
*/
STORE_REGS %_ASM_DI, VMX_vcpu_arch_regs, \
%_ASM_AX, %_ASM_CX, %_ASM_DX, %_ASM_BX, %_ASM_BP, %_ASM_SI
POP_REGS %_ASM_DI, VMX_vcpu_arch_regs, %_ASM_DI
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
STORE_REGS %_ASM_DI, VMX_vcpu_arch_regs, \
%r8, %r9, %r10, %r11, %r12, %r13, %r14, %r15
#endif
/* Clear return value to indicate VM-Exit (as opposed to VM-Fail). */
xor %ebx, %ebx
.Lclear_regs:
/*
* Clear all general purpose registers except RSP and RBX to prevent
* speculative use of the guest's values, even those that are reloaded
* via the stack. In theory, an L1 cache miss when restoring registers
* could lead to speculative execution with the guest's values.
* Zeroing XORs are dirt cheap, i.e. the extra paranoia is essentially
* free. RSP and RBX are exempt as RSP is restored by hardware during
* VM-Exit and RBX is explicitly loaded with 0 or 1 to hold the return
* value.
*/
CLEAR_REGS %eax, %ecx, %edx, %ebp, %esi, %edi
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
CLEAR_REGS %r8d, %r9d, %r10d, %r11d, %r12d, %r13d, %r14d, %r15d
#endif
/*
* IMPORTANT: RSB filling and SPEC_CTRL handling must be done before
* the first unbalanced RET after vmexit!
*
* For retpoline or IBRS, RSB filling is needed to prevent poisoned RSB
* entries and (in some cases) RSB underflow.
*
* eIBRS has its own protection against poisoned RSB, so it doesn't
* need the RSB filling sequence. But it does need to be enabled, and a
* single call to retire, before the first unbalanced RET.
*/
FILL_RETURN_BUFFER %_ASM_CX, RSB_CLEAR_LOOPS, X86_FEATURE_RSB_VMEXIT,\
X86_FEATURE_RSB_VMEXIT_LITE
/* Clobbers RAX, RCX, RDX, RSI. */
ALTERNATIVE "jmp .Lspec_ctrl_host_done", "", X86_FEATURE_MSR_SPEC_CTRL
mov WORD_SIZE(%_ASM_SP), %_ASM_DI
RESTORE_HOST_SPEC_CTRL_BODY VMX_spec_ctrl(%_ASM_DI), (%_ASM_SP), .Lspec_ctrl_host_done
.Lspec_ctrl_host_done:
/*
* Halt speculation past a conditional wrmsr. Intel's eIBRS
* guarantees that the guest cannot control the RSB "once IBRS is
* set", but in the eIBRS case speculative execution past the 'je'
* can go all the way to the RET below while MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL
* still holds the guest value.
*/
ALTERNATIVE_2 "", "lfence", X86_FEATURE_MSR_SPEC_CTRL, \
"", X86_FEATURE_KERNEL_IBRS
CLEAR_BRANCH_HISTORY_VMEXIT
/* Put return value in AX */
mov %_ASM_BX, %_ASM_AX
/* Pop our saved arguments from the stack */
pop %_ASM_BX
pop %_ASM_BX
/* ... and then the callee-save registers */
pop %_ASM_BX
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
pop %r12
pop %r13
pop %r14
pop %r15
#else
pop %esi
pop %edi
#endif
pop %_ASM_BP
RET
.Lfixup:
cmpb $0, _ASM_RIP(virt_rebooting)
jne .Lvmfail
ud2
.Lvmfail:
/* VM-Fail: set return value to 1 */
mov $1, %_ASM_BX
jmp .Lclear_regs
SYM_FUNC_END(__vmx_vcpu_run)
#ifndef CONFIG_CC_HAS_ASM_GOTO_OUTPUT
/**
* vmread_error_trampoline - Trampoline from inline asm to vmread_error()
* @field: VMCS field encoding that failed
* @fault: %true if the VMREAD faulted, %false if it failed
*
* Save and restore volatile registers across a call to vmread_error(). Note,
* all parameters are passed on the stack.
*/
SYM_FUNC_START(vmread_error_trampoline)
push %_ASM_BP
mov %_ASM_SP, %_ASM_BP
push %_ASM_AX
push %_ASM_CX
push %_ASM_DX
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
push %rdi
push %rsi
push %r8
push %r9
push %r10
push %r11
#endif
/* Load @field and @fault to arg1 and arg2 respectively. */
mov 3*WORD_SIZE(%_ASM_BP), %_ASM_ARG2
mov 2*WORD_SIZE(%_ASM_BP), %_ASM_ARG1
call vmread_error_trampoline2
/* Zero out @fault, which will be popped into the result register. */
_ASM_MOV $0, 3*WORD_SIZE(%_ASM_BP)
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
pop %r11
pop %r10
pop %r9
pop %r8
pop %rsi
pop %rdi
#endif
pop %_ASM_DX
pop %_ASM_CX
pop %_ASM_AX
pop %_ASM_BP
RET
SYM_FUNC_END(vmread_error_trampoline)
#endif